This paper examines ethical criteria for the shaping of an emerging technology applied internationally in environmental regulation: quantitative risk assessment-risk management. The role of the physician in its application, especially in the genetic testing that will be employed, underlines the importance of understanding the nature and prospects for reshaping of this technology to enable ethical practice. The Cartesian or mechanistic model (which currently dominates the technology) excludes factors of emotion, making the connection between assessment and management unfruitful functionally and ethically, and makes the model unresponsive to human needs. The emotional factors, nested and mediated in the organic hierarchy of the ecologically-defined community, constitute key psychological, social, cultural and political elements of the total burden of risk. Ethical criteria consistent with an open society are suggested for reshaping the model to enable effective management.
Whatever there is to fear is a fear of ourselves. We create, select and shape technologies, and deal with their aftermath through the creation of still other technologies.
In the process of creation, selection and shaping, we play a game, albeit a game critical to the preservation and quality of our lives, the game of 'as if. Given the absence of omniscience, we have learned to play this game, not only in constructing scientific models, but social and moral models as well, each kind sharing some of the assumptions of the other. Models shown to be heuristic, either scientifically or socially, are retained. Those that are not must either be changed or abandoned.
Bertrand Russell observed that '... all rational conduct of life is based upon the method of the frivolous historical game in which we discuss what the world would be like if Cleopatra's nose had been half an inch longer'. 1 This simple yet profound characteristic of the ancient Euclidean science we historically mimic as the penultimate example of reason in operation, was not always understood: the heuristic criteria for retaining the assumptions and premises in any axiomatic method. This oversight is seen in the history of basic constructs of science.
The mathematic models of time and space for Newton were derived from God. This was disputed.
Neopolitan Giambattista Vico made the plea that mathematics reflects not reality but invention, not the structure of the universe but manmade axioms (c/. Axiom 39). 2 The Golden Bay of Naples was, however, only a tidal pool in the mainstream of science, which had veered far to the north, to the grey Baltic, where the physicist and philosopher Kant also rejected the role of Newton's God, but substituted intuition. Not until the age of Einstein was the role of intuition rejected and Vico's insight fully surfaced in the stream of scientific thought. Black boxes, blinking lights and print-outs of confidence computations not withstanding, only heuristic values that vet or select our constructs now prevail in the face of intractable uncertainty of what is real, not just in science, but in 'all rational conduct. ' What is 'heuristic' or unfruitful, however, is never arbitrary. Choices and judgements are made by humans who biologically and culturally evolve. Technology is a part of that evolution. Evolution, whether biological or cultural, is change within a complex structured community, and thus of the community itself. These changes affect not only the course of technological development, but of how, under what moral conditions, and in what kind of social structure within that community we use technology to meet our evolved needs.
Many of us understand that we have evolved a common set of technologies shared globally. Fewer understand the concurrent common ethic that arises from common needs rooted in our common biological and cultural development. Without this understanding, there are no winners in the games of 'as if', only losers.
THE NEW GAMES: MODELS OF ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT
The ethical issues the physician faces are seldom new. The computer-facilitated explosion in molecular biological technology raises fears of genetic testing in a computer-linked society. These fears are justified by well-documented and unresolved ethical, legal and social issues associated not with the unravelling of the human genome per se, but from an application of this technology that transcends past patterns of detection and therapy of disease through genetic testing or clinical intervention.
These fears test ethical protections of well-being in the patient-physician relationship as old as the Hippocratic Oath: patient privacy and the injunction to do no harm. They test assumptions physicians have taken for granted in their codes of ethics, such as the freedom of choice implied in the voluntary informed consent procedure. They test the new role of the physician in a regulatory fashion taking hold in most industrial nations: risk assessment-risk management of the environments of the workplace and community.
Genetic screening to be administered by physicians will provide biomarkers in the assessment of the risk of disease for purposes of risk management. The physician will help titrate exposures, monitor genetic changes and deal with clinical sequellae. The physician will be more than a bystander.
Will the physician's role enhance an open society, or enable leper colonies of 'susceptibles': precursors to the caste systems of the closed society? 3 Before this question can be answered, and the institutions of the physician charged with making ethically-appropriate accommodations in their codes and licensing requirements to protect themselves and their patients, the physician must understand 'the new game'.
The nature of the new regulatory fashion is not well-known. It entered law with the United States Supreme Court's Benzene (or risk assessment) decision of 1980, the case of the Industrial Union Department,' AFL-CIO vs. American Petroleum Institute. 4 The decision unleashed tremendous forces within the international academic community. A new risk assessment-management discipline developed, based on the demand of industry through the lawsuit, replete with its own professional society, operating institutions and journals. The budgets of governments and industries in virtually every industrialized country for personnel and funds for professional training and lay education reflect its impact. Entire research programmes in medicine, environmental science, toxicology, epidemiology and genetics have been either abandoned or altered to meet its needs.
What has not been done administratively to engage the academic, industrial, environmental, labour and governmental scientists and physicians in this discipline, is proposed in sweeping laws that would transform past modes of regulating what we eat and breathe, how we work and play, and even how industrial medicine will be practised.
The court's decision was perceived as a loss for the industrial unions who petitioned the Occupational Safety and Health Administration for emergency action on a workplace standard that would yield more protection from the risk of cancer.* On its face, the decision was far from die disaster that many believed had taken place. The plurality on the court required the regulator -the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) -to make a significant risk determination for the purpose of setting regulatory priorities before proceeding with the promulgation of a standard or regulation. However, the requirement was not to be 'a mathematical straitjacket', but could be 'based on policy considerations' that need not be supported 'with anything approaching scientific certainty', 'risking error on the side of overprotection rather than underprotection'. 5 The fears of labour, however, have been justified by an interpretation of the decision that has resulted in thousands of lives shortened and hundreds of millions of dollars wasted each year.
It was in the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), unhindered by the courts, where another face was put on the court decision. What the industry lost in court was gained administratively, not only for setting regulatory priorities, but also for titrating exposures. This was done by attempting to place in the same calculus, dose-response data with cost/benefit economic data. This revision, prohibited by subsequent Supreme Court decisions in the case of workplace standards (but done openly by the Office of Management and Budget in the Office of the President) was eased by the fact that the decision was a plurality and not a majority decision. The court was badly divided.
EPA chartered a National Academy of Science (NAS) committee to fine tune the policy. The finetuned policy creates an artificial distinction between the assessors and the managers. 7 The distinction (but not necessarily the entire assessment-management process) was supported by many in the environmental and labour movements (including this writer), the National Institutes for Health and most involved university scientists. In hindsight, this was a mistake.
The separation was meant to protect from distortion the purported objectivity of science in the regulatory process, as if scientists can divorce knowing how a risk would be managed from the design of the assessment models they use. The futility of separation is implied in the NAS report, which made clear the importance of revealing the policy ramifications of the assessments.
William Ruckelshaus, Administrator of EPA, in his public embrace of the NAS report, chose to believe that the policy ramifications could be put aside in assessment. 'Nothing will erode public confidence faster than the suspicion that policy considerations have been allowed to influence the assessment of risk,' he said. Ruckelshaus wanted 'an objective way to assess risk'. Of course, he added, 'there is no purely objective way to manage it'. 8 Nor, Ruckelshaus failed to understand, is there a 'purely objective way' to assess risk. Inherent in even the assessment model are a set of subjective assumptions stemming in part from the value judgements of the assessor and in part by the fact that while assessment and management can, and perhaps should, be administered separately, the needs of the manager teleologically drive the design of the assessment. The needs of the manager, as perceived by the manager, and the consequent ethic of the management become the crux of the problem.
Put simply, risk assessment models (indeed all models) sequester data in much the same way that a lawyer marshalls the premises and evidence of a legal argument, to prove an a priori presumption which he/she promotes or defends. In such arguments, the lawyers on both sides often seek stipulations or findings of fact upon which both sides can agree. This kind of agreement was what EPA hoped to find in risk assessment. The agreement of two lawyers and a judge is not a paradigm easily accepted outside the court room.
The version of risk assessment-management suggested by the plurality of the Supreme Court was consistent with policies previously recommended by committees of the National Academy of Science in two reports published in \915: Principles for Evaluating Chemicals In The Environment 1 and Decisionmaking for Regulating Chemicals In The Environment. This effort incorporated methods of toxicologic and epidemiologic quantification. These and other data, however, were to be displayed in a framework, not integrated in the same calculus, as risk management data. This procedure was intended to discourage distortions of scientific data to fit incommensurable methods of quantification in cost-benefit economic analysis.
'Highly formalized methods' were rejected. 'Value judgements about noncommensurate factors in a decision such as life, health, aesthetics and equity should be explicitly dealt with by the politically responsible decisionmakers and not hidden in purportedly objective data and analysis'. 10 Neither these warnings, nor the plurality decision of the Supreme Court, slowed the development of inappropriate models. The confusion of numbers with precision and scientific certainty with objectivity, and the rejection of factors either not quantifiable or commensurate was and is rampant among the practitioners of the new risk assessment discipline.
Thus, it is not surprising that there is little verifiable evidence that quantitative assessment has played a critical role in environmental management by any agency of government.
Assessment and management: the malconnection
There is no purely mathematic -as distinct from moral -calculus representing a connected assessmentmanagement system. If there has been a connection between models of assessment and management, it has been a bad connection. Analytically, the reasons are obvious:
• Different levels of scope (management may include [typically, assessment models do not include] social, cultural, ecological and economic parameters),
• Mismatched quantification (minute titration is less relevant in control than in establishing dose-response relationships),
• Issues of moral certainty (prudence and p-values may have little in common),
• Differences in commensurability of methods and data over time (the values of present life are not the values of future life),
• Ethical, social, cultural, ecological and a broad spectrum of economic risks are excluded,
• Biological and environmental end-points are incorporated in the assessment only when quantified,
• Data selection comes from a pool contaminated by the biased designs of the sponsors of research, who decide who shall receive the funds, how much shall be spent and how the results shall be evaluated.
At their best, the current models of assessment are biomedical models loosely linked by some assumptions and purposes jointly held with models of management, which are social models, with radical differences in method of data selection, collection and interpretation. They do not include critical ethical, habitat, social, socio-economic and cultural values in models that can comprehend and manage the toted burden of risk to the entire human niche. Those values which have been systematically excluded by the design of the current paradigm are the values most laden with emotion. Why?
Emotion and science
Why have emotion-laden values been excluded? The most persistent arguments for the employment of risk assessment-management have been appeals for the exclusion of emotion through the application of what is believed to be scientific, by which they mean mechanistic, to the exclusion of what its proponents call 'demogogic polities'. There was, and is, a demand for the exercise of artificial 'rules of reason' which exclude the logic of behaviours that avoid pain and fear. Yet a substrate in the reasoning process is risk avoidance in which emotion is a key ingredient. To reason is to do more than engage cold inference in a syllogism.
The proponents of the argument for exclusion of emotion seek release from human bondage, from passion, and access to a world of detached fact and absolute objectivity. They use the language of chance. 'Accident' is their favourite cause of environmental disease and injury, as if life is only a cherry blossom, moved by vagrant winds of chance that know no master. An appealing apparition.
In this quest, for good reasons, they often are joined by many in the scientific community. In the absence of the ability to trace every filament of Darwin's Web of causation, statistical methods and other surrogate procedures are fruitful. Used heuristically, the result is discovery, not because these methods describe ultimate reality, but because of their success in achieving the limited purposes to which they are put. What they lack in metaphysical pretention, they gain in expediting discoveries often spectacular and rewarded in selfgratification as well as socially by their peers and financially by sponsors and grateful publics. The numbers, the hard facts found in the clinic, the laboratory and in the records, are selected, organized and interpreted by habits of thought and cultural traditions spanning thirty centuries, reviewed in institutions of peers with the same habits and traditions reinforced by the same rewards.
All this becomes something called science, or collective scientific objectivity, believed to be above and apart from every other element of our culture. The scientist is made comfortable. He can spend an entire life at a distance from the hospital ward, the shop floor or the political struggle. Even the physician is admonished to be sympathetic, but not diverted by sympathy, to maintain clinical distance, to avoid being influenced by the pain of the patient or the suffering of the family. To be encapsulated by a white coat, shielded by a code of ethics and supported by professional solidarity. To be 'objective'. To be separated. From what? From emotion.
Emotion and governance
The historic quest for an 'objective', detached world of fact and inference from which emotion, or at least some emotion, is excluded, is hardly unique to the scientific enterprise. Indeed, it is a result of an entwined ancient history of the search for justice in the political affairs of the community through an appeal to cold reason alone, illustrated in the trial of Socrates and Caesar's argument for mercy for Cataline's coconspirators.
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The failure to find a harmony of inference and emotion in human affairs was magnified by strains of 'positivistic' and 'scientific' political and social thought drawn from the appearance of cold reason in the paradigmatic revolutions in science in the industrializing West. This was not without cause in a world whose masses had been rent by nearly unfettered emotion for thousands of years of bigotry, war, famine and plague that defies understanding itself. Unfortunately, comforting certainties were sought in a void filled by a few straws of illusion.
In that world, at the headwaters of contemporary science, stood Descartes and his mechanical bodies bifurcated from atomistic minds preoccupied with themselves, wrenched from the systems of communities -from cells to nations -that are the whole human in communities of humans in nature. As bodies, we were seen to be like the automatons in the great clocks of Strasbourg and Prague, connected to mind through a mythical gland that was the control tree from which the human marionette is suspended and moved by its strings.
Emotion and evolution
The mainstream of science has been veering from the Cartesian paradigm for some time. Darwin's careful documentation of the development in lower and higher species of instinctive simultudes of love and the desire to be loved, of anger and appeasement, of fear and its avoidance, changed our understanding of emotion and S. W. Sammuels: Ethical and metaethical cntena 245 of mind itself in natural and cultural evolution. 13 The communities of cells, tissues, organs, organ systems and their associated mechanisms that are the human, in communities of humans, are organically structured hierarchies. These are the nests of emotion. Never unfettered or spontaneous, emotion is determined and often consciously determinable at every level of the hierarchical structure of the nest that has evolved through cultural and biological change.
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The phylogeny of emotion described by Darwin is paralleled, and to an extent supported, by ontogenetic behavioural studies in many species by Tinbergen, Lorenz, Rignano, Piaget, Freud, Fromm and others. These studies illuminate the mechanisms by which emotion is not only generated, but controlled in the biologically and culturally structured nest. Controlled emotion is at work in the evaluation of what is heuristic in the constructs that order and explain the data the scientist is dedicated to generate.
The models of human and ecological risk, for assessment or management, are no exception. The stated expections among proponents for the current models of risk assessment and management, for an emotionless, detached science can not be met. If the two are to be linked fruitfully, assessment must comprehend the total burden of risk, including risk to emotionally-laden values found in the study of culture, society and habitat.
This conclusion is not found only in the analyses of partisans for more governmental regulation. It is at least implied in the views of philosopher Nicholas Rescher, a spokesman for the Quantitative Risk Assessment tied to cost/benefit analysis.
Ethical criteria for judging models
For Rescher, government risk regulation is 'paternalist'. His 'elemental principle of fairness' shifts the costs of control to the beneficiaries. (Unfortunately, some beneficiaries are also victims.) The 'reduced freedom of action' through regulation 'brings us closer to the police state collectivization, the erosion of privacy, and bureaucratic "big brother" regulation of our personal and corporate dealings'. 16 While taking issue with this view, I do not disagree with three key findings 16 of Professor Rescher:
• 'Questions of risk assessment (and management) pose fundamentally normative questions.'
• 'There is systematic disagreement between probabilists working in mathematics or natural science and decision theorists.... The former take the line that small numbers are small numbers and must be taken into account as such. The latter tend to take the view that small probabilities represent extremely remote prospects and can be written off'.
• The assessment of risk may become irrelevant to the management of risk, since the latter is never 'politically uncontaminated.' The political factor is a key part of the management process.
In addition too these criteria, the basis for judging models of assessment and management should be broadened. Managers and assessors of risk need to respond to the requirements of an open society. These requirements include:
• Respect for the hallmark of an open society: the rights to participation and the derivative rightsto-know of those affected and their communities.
• Full disclosure of the assumptions of the models, the policies implied by the model assumptions, the reasons for the selection or rejection of data, and display of socioeconomic and cultural data which while often unquantifiable, meet the emotional needs of those affected and their communities.
• Emotion is a critical element in normative values which, if ignored, makes both models less relevant and incoherently joined.
• Differences between normative values must be recognized, i.e., between relative cultural norms deviation from which may or may not be ethically tolerable, and absolute ethical norms, deviation from which in all cases is intolerable.
• Cultural norms can and must be changed when used to rationalize unnecessary risk.
• Unnecessary risks should not be titrated, only ended. In the process of mediation in an open society, even small or improbable risks, if they are unnecessary risks and thus without moral claim, are rejected by the community. (Not for probabilistic reasons, but on ethical grounds, open societies reject management of risk based upon simplistic 'greatest benefit for the greatest number', to protect the rights of individuals and small groups from cannibalism. A balance of antinomies evolves.
)
• The models must conform to the demands for ethical application by its practitioners. If data can not be gathered ethically, it ought not be gathered.
• Management of risk must comprehend the emotion-mediating structure of the nest.
(Mediation enables predictability of emotion through strong family, peer group and other elements of the community structure, which functions as a polis, i.e., in a politically-integrated collection of communities.)
• Emotion is made more predictable during cultural change when the political function is itself mediated by the ethical forces of an open system society. Closed systems generate anomic or irrational behaviour.
Making the connection It is by understanding the concept of community that we connect assessment and management of human and ecological risk. Probabilistic methods of assessing risk are used to look at effects, often without ever determining real cause. In the absence of omniscience, that may still mean that it is a useful tool. It can be more useful if the structure of the method is brought closer to the structure of the real world.
The real world is not composed of atomistic creatures. It is composed of communities bonded by communicated norms that support and challenge our needs, including emotion itself. Communities are structured naturally, not by the castes of the anomic closed society, but by the organic hierarchies of the open society that evolves culturally and biologically. Darwin's web of causation is not created by a spider weaving a single strand on a single dimension. It is multi-stranded, multidimensional, encompassing not just the machinery of the body, but also our biologically and culturally evolved emotions. Heuristic technologies of assessment and management must reflect this reality.
